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Charter School Tax Credit
C
ommunity development finance leverages government subsidy programs to raise market-rate capital 
to fund community revitalization projects. This financing supports a flexible network of community 
development service providers (such as affordable housing developers) administered through a series of 
public-private partnerships. This network-driven approach to revitalizing low-income communities has 
been very effective and could be adapted to support the growth of innovative and effective charter schools serving 
high-poverty students as well. 
Among the resources available to community development finance practitioners, investment tax credits may be the 
most important. Investment tax credit structures are used to raise private capital to fund public projects, price risk, 
protect against program failure, and induce greater public-private cooperation. The federal government adminis-
ters two public-private anti-poverty investment tax credit programs: the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
and the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC). They finance, respectively, affordable housing and economic development 
in low-income communities.
The public-private investment tax credit structure allows the government to fund social programs on a conditional 
basis. Specifically, if a project fails to deliver the desired social outcomes (affordable housing or economic develop-
ment, depending on the program), tax credit investors face credit recapture and financial losses. Either way, the 
government spends money only on successes and not on failures.1
Anti-poverty investment tax credits shift program failure risk from the government to the private sector. In ex-
change for taking on this risk, private investors receive a tax reduction significant enough to generate investor 
demand. This has two significant public advantages. First, it imposes market discipline on the provision of public 
services. The government is not always in the best position to evaluate publicly-funded programs; private investors 
may underwrite these programs more effectively. Second, these models create a structure for government to invest 
in programs that may not fully “pay out” for many years after the initial investment is made. LIHTC-financed develop-
ments, for example, are required to produce a public benefit (affordable housing) for a minimum of 15 years. 
This paper outlines how such an investment structure might be used to solve a different challenge: chronic aca-
demic underachievement among low-income students. The academic achievement gap is well documented and 
seemingly intractable. Low-income students do consistently worse than their middle and upper-income peers in all 
measures of academic success at every grade level, including standardized test scores, high school graduation rates, 
and college completion rates.2 
A number of social and education reforms have been offered to help close the achievement gap. This paper will not 
attempt to add to this voluminous history; rather, it will explore a new approach to financing schools that dem-
onstrate success in closing the gap. It will also deliberately steer clear of any discussion of pedagogy. Curriculum 
reform is beyond the scope of this proposal as well.
That said, this paper will focus on a particular type of school—charters—because many have demonstrated suc-
cess serving low-income students.3 Readers should not interpret this as an endorsement of charters over traditional 
public schools. Rather, the focus on charters is an attempt to narrow the scope of this proposal to induce more 
constructive analysis of a financing mechanism that, although not discussed here, could potentially be used to 









3	 	Center	for	Research	on	Education	Outcomes	(CREDO),	Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States,	(Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University,	
2009),	p.	7,	available	at	credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf.6
In essence, this proposal combines two existing policy tools—investment tax credits and charter schools—to raise 
operating funds for high-achieving charters that demonstrate success in closing the poverty-related academic 
achievement gap. Low-income students consistently under  academically. In some cases, however, charter 
schools that serve high-poverty communities have succeeded in dramatically improving low-income student per-
formance. These successful charters differ dramatically in type and approach. As a result, it is difficult to identify a 
single, or combination of variables, in any one charter that, if replicated, would produce the same results across the 
public school system. This proposal acknowledges the difficulty of so-called “silver bullet” program replication and 
considers an alternative: cultivating a diverse array of education approaches using tools developed by the commu-
nity development finance industry over the last 30 years.4 
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I examines the poverty-related academic achievement gap and outlines a new 
role for charter schools serving high-poverty students; Part II explores how an investment tax credit could be used 
to grow a network of high-achieving charters that serve low-income communities; Part III details its mechanics; and 






Part I: Closing the Poverty Achievement Gap
An epidemic of underachievement
S
tudents in the United States are dropping out of high school at an alarming rate: 1.2 million a year, by one 
estimate.5 High school dropouts are more likely to be unemployed, go to prison, and seek government sup-
port.6 As a result, “the individual and social costs of ignoring high school dropouts—or of focusing attention 
and resources only on those who show up in the criminal justice and welfare systems—are enormous.”7 According 
to a 2009 report by the Center for Labor Market Studies, the average high school dropout costs the government 
$292,000 over his or her working lifetime in lower tax revenue, public assistance, and incarceration costs.8
The drop-out problem is particularly acute in low-income communities. Poor students drop out of high school at six 
times the rate of their more affluent peers.9 This leads to increased income inequality, perpetuating the cycle of pov-
erty.10 A recent Brookings Institution study calculated that over the course of a 45-year career high school dropouts 
earn $700,000 less than their counterparts with diplomas.11 It follows, as many education and poverty experts have 
argued, that increasing the high school graduation rate of low-income children would have a profound anti-poverty 
effect. “Education is our path out of poverty,” according to U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.12
Admittedly, the role of schools in low-income student achievement is still hotly debated. Low-income students tend 
to receive less academic support at home than higher-income students. For example, the average middle-class 
child enters first grade with 1,000-1,700 hours of one-on-one picture-book reading, whereas a child from a low-in-
come family averages only 25 hours.13 Likewise, in a widely-cited 2003 report, Betty Hart and Todd Risley found that, 
by age three, the underprivileged children they studied had heard an estimated 30 million fewer words than their 
5	 	Editorial	Projects	in	Education	Research	Center,	Diplomas Count 2008: School to College: Can State P-16 Councils Ease the Transition?	(Bethesda,	
MD:	Education Week,	2008).
6	 	Alliance	for	Excellent	Education,	The High Cost of High School Dropouts: What the Nation Pays for Inadequate High Schools	(Issue	Brief,	October	
2007),	available	at	http://www.all4ed.org/files/archive/publications/HighCost.pdf.
7	 Dan	Bloom	and	Ron	Haskins,	Policy Brief: Helping High School Dropouts Improve Their Prospects	(Princeton:	The	Future	of	Children,	Spring	2010),	p.	
5,	available	at	www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0427_helping_dropouts_haskins/0427_helping_dropouts_haskins.pdf.
8	 	$6,087	in	annual	federal,	state,	and	local	tax	payments	and	$6,197	annual	cash	and	in-kind	transfers	plus	imposed	incarceration	costs	among	adults	18-
64.	Andrew	Sum,	et	al.,	The Consequences of Dropping Out of High School	(Boston:	Northeastern	University,	October	2009),	p.	14,	available	at	www.
clms.neu.edu/publication/documents/The_Consequences_of_Dropping_Out_of_High_School.pdf.	See	also:	L.	J.	Lochner	and	E.	Moretti,	“The	Effect	of	
Education	on	Crime:	Evidence	from	Prison	Inmates,	Arrests,	and	Self-reports,”	American Economic Review,	94(1),	2004,	p.	155–189.	See	also:	James	
J.	Heckman	and	Dimitriy	V.	Masterov,	The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young Children	(T.W.	Schultz	Award	Lecture	at	the	Allied	Social	Sci-
ences	Association	annual	meeting,	Chicago,	January	5-7,	2007),	available	at	jenni.uchicago.edu/human-inequality/papers/Heckman_final_all_wp_2007-
03-22c_jsb.pdf.
9	 	US	Department	of	Education,	National	Center	for	Education	Statistics,	The Condition of Education 2004	(Washington,	DC:	U.S.	Government	Printing	
Office,	Indicator	10,	2004),	p.	11.





land,	John	J.	DiIulio,	Jr.,	and	Karen	Burke	Morison,	The Silent Epidemic: Perspectives of High School Graduates,	(Washington:	Civic	Enterprises,	
March	2006),	p.	2,	“Students	who	drop	out	of	high	school	are…twice	as	likely	as	high	school	graduates	to	slip	into	poverty	from	one	year	to	the	next,”	
available	at	www.civicenterprises.net/pdfs/thesilentepidemic3-06.pdf.	Also:	Alison	H.	Dickson,	et	al.,	Earnings and Poverty Consequences of Dropping 













more privileged peers.14 Some argue that schools should be responsible for remedying this academic deficit, while 
others discount the impact that schools can make when students arrive so unprepared to learn.15 Even skeptics 
acknowledge, however, that while schools alone may not be sufficient to close the academic gap, they are certainly a 
necessary part of the solution. 
School failure and reform
Roughly 2000 public high schools (approximately 13 percent) produce 51 percent of America’s dropouts. These 
“dropout factories” consistently lose more than 40 percent of their students between ninth and twelfth grades.16 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of these schools operate in high-poverty communities: “Nearly 90% of 
high schools with very low graduation rates educate large numbers of low-income students,” according to the Center 
for Social Organization of Schools at Johns Hopkins University.17 
Low graduation rates are only part of the story, however. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), 
responsible for collecting education data for the U.S. Department of Education, publishes The Condition of Educa-
tion, an annual public school assessment report. In its 2010 report, the NCES highlighted several additional ways 
in which low-income students are underperforming academically including reading, math, visual arts, and four-year 
college attendance.18 In short, many high-poverty schools consistently deliver sub-par academic results, across a 
number of criteria, contributing to the ongoing academic achievement gap. 
Concerned experts have advocated for substantial education reforms to address this gap. The most common 
reforms involve smaller classes and schools, greater incorporation of early-childhood programs, more rigorous 
academic standards, improved teacher quality, and more challenging course offerings.19 Such reforms are difficult 
to scale, however, because public education is decentralized in the United States. Each state sets its own curriculum 
standards, and local control of schools—administered by superintendents, school boards, principals, and parents—
is a central feature of the American education model. This inability to achieve system-wide improvements threatens 
reform efforts and risks “superficial impact,” which is, “pleasant, but ultimately pointless,” according to the Center for 
Social Organization of Schools.20
Charters: an alternative approach
By design, charter schools are public schools that operate outside the normal public school governance structure 
and have the freedom to experiment with many aspects of the education delivery model. There are currently more 





17	 	Robert	Balfanz	and	Nettie	Legters,	The Graduation Gap: Using Promoting Power to Examine the Number and Characteristics of High Schools with 
High and Low Graduation Rates in the Nation and Each State	(Baltimore,	MD:	Johns	Hopkins	University,	CSOS	Policy	Brief,	January	2005),	p.	2,	
available	at	web.jhu.edu/bin/i/j/Policy_Brief.pdf.













20	 	Robert	Balfanz	and	Nettie	Legters,	Locating the Dropout Crisis,	(Baltimore,	MD:	Johns	Hopkins	University,	2004),	p.	1—2,	available	at	web.jhu.edu/
bin/i/j/Policy_Brief.pdf.
21	 	Dynarski,	Susan,	et	al.,	Charter Schools: A Report on Rethinking the Federal Role in Education	(Washington:	Brown	Center	on	Education	Policy	at	
Brookings	Institution,	December	16,	2010),	p.	2,	available	at	www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/1216_charter_schools/1216_charter_
schools.pdf.9
“single sex schools, schools for the performing arts, schools for science and technology, bilingual schools, schools 
for the disabled, schools for drop-outs, and virtual schools where learning takes place online.”22 Many incorporate 
novel education elements in their curricula and provide wrap-around social services as needed.
Among the most well-known charter organizations is the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP), a national network 
of 99 free, open enrollment, college-preparatory public schools serving more than 26,000 students in 20 states and 
the District of Columbia.23 KIPP’s mission is to build a “culture of achievement” based on five operating principles 
known as the Five Pillars. These principles, coupled with a Commitment to Excellence pledge that all students, par-
ents, and teachers must take, “help students from educationally underserved communities develop the knowledge, 
skills, character and habits needed to succeed in college and the competitive world beyond.”24
Other charter schools, such as those operated by the Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), take a more holistic ap-
proach. Named “one of the biggest social experiments of our time” by Paul Tough at The New York Times, the HCZ 
provides program participants with a continuous pipeline of reinforcing social and educational services throughout 
childhood.25 The pipeline begins with Baby College, targeting children up to age 3, and continues with “in-school, 
after-school, social-service, health and community-building programs.”26 These services, offered together, represent a 
massive, coordinated intervention in the lives of HCZ participants and the HCZ district in which they live. 
The charter school movement has received significant support from education-reform-minded philanthropists. 
The HCZ, for example, successfully raised $44 million from private donors to cover two-thirds of its fiscal year 2009 
operations budget.27 Charter Management Organizations (CMOs), like KIPP, have received more than half a billion 
dollars from foundations over the past decade.28 This enthusiasm among anti-poverty grantmakers is, at least, par-
tially validated by new data on charter performance. According to the Center for Research on Education Outcomes 
(CREDO) at Stanford University:
In our nationally pooled sample, two subgroups fare better in charters than in the traditional sys-
tem: students in poverty and [English Language Learner] ELL students. This is no small feat. In these 
cases, our numbers indicate that charter students who fall into these categories are outperform-
ing their [traditional public school] TPS counterparts in both reading and math. These populations, 
then, have clearly been well served by the introduction of charters into the education landscape.29
In light of this data and considering the strong relationship between education and income, it is no surprise that 
the philanthropic community has embraced charters as a vehicle to combat poverty. 
Criticisms of charters
Like traditional public schools, charters succeed and fail on the basis of their unique mix of students, faculty, ad-
ministration, mission, curriculum, and approach. Some charters have been extremely successful, whereas others have 
not. Successful schools have been studied and cited as national models to be replicated.30 
Nevertheless, charters have been the target of strong criticism from traditional public school advocates, such as the 
National Education Association (NEA), which represents public school teachers, personnel, university faculty, and 
students training to be teachers. The NEA has voiced concerns about charter effectiveness, accountability, organi-




25	 	Paul	Tough,	“The	Harlem	Project,”	The New York Times,	June	20,	2004,	available	at	www.nytimes.com/2004/06/20/magazine/the-harlem-project.html?s
cp=1&sq=The+Harlem+Project&st=nyt.
26	 	Harlem	Children’s	Zone,	“About	Us:	The	HCZ	Project,”	available	at	www.hcz.org/about-us/the-hcz-project.
27	 	The	Harlem	Children’s	Zone,	Whatever It Takes: A White Paper on the Harlem Children’s Zone	(2009),	p.	18,	available	at	www.policylink.org/atf/
cf/%7B97c6d565-bb43-406d-a6d5-eca3bbf35af0%7D/HCZ%20FINAL%20WHITE%20PAPER%20SHORT%20VERSION.PDF.





potential to facilitate education reforms and develop new and creative teaching methods that can be replicated in 
traditional public schools for the benefit of all children.”31
As public schools, charters must give every student that applies an opportunity to attend, either through open 
enrollment or a lottery. Despite this requirement, critics have charged that charter schools “skim” high-potential 
students from the larger public school population.32 Most students access charters through an opt-in application 
system. As a result, critics argue, they positively select for students with motivated parents (a significant predictor of 
academic success).33 This selection bias can be particularly pernicious, critics contend, when charter school applica-
tions include essays and personal interviews, as is sometimes the case.
Discipline policies can reinforce these selection effects as well. Unlike traditional public schools, charter schools 
have more flexibility to expel, or “push out,” students for disruptive behavior. A joint-investigation by Catalyst Chi-
cago and WBEZ-Chicago, for example, reported that “in 85 percent of charter school cases, students were expelled 
for less serious offenses that are not eligible for expulsion under [Chicago Public School] rules. Once expelled, 
charter students are sent back to their neighborhood school by the district’s Office of Adjudication.”34 Examples like 
this, charter critics suggest, indicate that charter schools will tend to have better-motivated, better-behaved students 
than traditional public schools. For these and other reasons, the NEA, for example, believes “it is difficult—not to 
mention scientifically invalid—to make blanket comparisons of charter schools to traditional public schools.”35
Finally, the available evidence suggests many charter schools perform poorly. According to Stanford University’s 
CREDO, 37 percent of charter schools “deliver learning results that are significantly worse” than traditional public 
schools.36 In theory, these failing schools should have their charters revoked but, in practice, very few are shuttered. 
“Despite low test scores, failing charter schools often have powerful and persuasive supporters in their communi-
ties who feel strongly that shutting down this school does not serve the best interests of currently enrolled stu-
dents.” Even as many charters excel at serving low-income students, this “authorizing crisis,” according to CREDO, 
“reflects poorly on charter schools as a whole.”37
Forget the silver bullet
Ray Budde, who is credited with conceiving of charters in 1974, wrote in Education by Charter: Restructuring School 
Districts, “There is a temptation to think that the best way to upgrade American public education would be to 
implement the key reforms through some kind of ‘master plan’.” Instead, he argued that “total education reform 
will probably proceed along a ragged front and in a rather unpredictable manner.”38 Today, charter schools serve as 
“laboratories that traditional public schools can learn from,” presumably to inform a system-wide reform plan to 
be implemented across all public schools.39 However, as Budde predicted, replicating these reforms—smaller classes, 
strict discipline policies, and so on—has been difficult to achieve within the decentralized education system. 
As a result, a number of promising strategies have simply become one-off success stories. “The appeal of mitosis-
style growth or ‘best practice’ imitation is undeniable,” acknowledge Monica Higgins and Frederick Hess in an Ameri-






John	Witte,	Charter Schools in Eight States Effects on Achievement, Attainment, Integration, and Competition (Santa	Monica,	CA:	RAND	Corporation,	
RAND	Education	Monograph	Series,	2009),	p.	53,	available	at	www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG869.pdf.











delivered by following such a course. Imitation may be flattering but decades of experience suggest that it is only 
haltingly effective when it comes to replicating even the most promising educational programs.”40 The inability of 
the charter movement to deliver replicable innovation—the “sine qua non of successful reform,” according to Hig-
gins and Hess—has locked it in a perpetual cycle of experimentation which, in turn, has led to policy inertia.
Given the challenge of unearthing a “silver bullet” solution, it may be time to abandon the laboratory view of char-
ters. Rather than waiting for a system-wide solution to bubble up from a charter school, policy makers could, instead, 
develop a network of charters that specializes in serving low-income students. Or, to put it another way, charter 
schools could be used more strategically to buttress the public school system instead of to reform it system-wide. 
Current funding levels are inadequate
On average, charter schools receive between 20 and 40 percent less in public funds than traditional public schools.41 
This forces many charters to rely on foundations and private donors to fill funding gaps. Over time, however, 
“reliance on foundation funding could become a serious barrier to the growth and scaling goals of many Charter 
Management Organizations,” warns the Education Sector, an independent education policy think tank. “As big as 
they are, even the largest foundations are dwarfed by the $600 billion annual cost of the American elementary and 
secondary education system.”42 As a result, any serious government intervention to scale the number of successful 
high-poverty charters will likely require federal government participation.
In fact, the Obama administration has already lobbied to increase federal funding for high functioning charters.43 
The $650 million “Investing in Innovation” fund and $4.35 billion “Race to the Top” competition, included in the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, provide funding to high achieving public schools, including charters, 
and the states that support them.44 The administration also signaled its commitment to significant education reform 
for low-income students when it created the “Promise Neighborhoods” initiative to develop twenty “comprehensive 
neighborhood programs, modeled after the Harlem Children’s Zone, designed to combat the effects of poverty and 
improve education and life outcomes for children, from birth through college.”45 As of this writing, $10 million has 
been appropriated to the program to be used for planning grants and $210 million has been requested to imple-
ment them.
Nevertheless, these federal programs, taken together, still appear to fall short of what is required to reverse wide-
spread academic underachievement in low-income communities. Instead, a new federal funding program, com-
mensurate with the magnitude of the challenge, is needed to deliver resources to a diverse set of charters operating 
in low-income neighborhoods. Specifically, this paper explores the creation of a new federal investment tax credit 
program, loosely modeled on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, to raise operating funds for high 
achieving charters that serve low-income students. 








Part II: Tax Credits – A New Approach to Funding  
High-Achieving Charters
T
he federal government spent an average of $1.40 per charter school student in fiscal year 2008-09.46 This fund-
ing, coupled with substantial philanthropic support and state per pupil allocations, may be adequate to sup-
port charters as laboratories for experimentation but it is insufficient to maintain a large network of charters, 
strategically employed to serve the hardest-to-reach students in high-poverty communities. According to the Educa-
tion Sector: 
Operating funding is paramount. The best charter networks have demonstrated that disadvantaged 
students can achieve at significantly higher levels than most do now…. But to get those strong re-
sults they have had to spend more money than they expected, and more money than has been avail-
able to them in many parts of the country. Under the education models of the leading charter net-
works, it takes more to do more. Public schools that deliver results—charter or otherwise—shouldn’t 
just get equal public funding; they should get additional funding to reflect their additional costs.47
Funding a diverse set of charters with different missions and approaches is a significant public finance challenge, 
however. It is far more common for the government to identify program “gazelles” and then fund their replication—
essentially, cloning successful programs writ large. In such cases, identifying the “best” program is crucial given the 
financial stakes of being wrong. According to the National Charter Research Project at the University of Washington 
this approach may not be appropriate, however, when it comes to funding charters, which differ dramatically by 
quality and feature. “Rather than responding to uneven quality in charter schools with centralized solutions, poli-
cymakers and funders must think creatively about new regulatory strategies that are appropriate to decentralized 
systems.” The question, then, is how can the government support a decentralized system of charters operating suc-
cessfully in low-income communities without undermining the operational autonomy that makes them successful? 
Or, to put it differently, how can the government scale up its funding without also scaling up its centralized control? 
Fortunately, this challenge has an instructive precedent. Faced with hundreds of thousands of deteriorating public 
housing units in the early 1970s, the federal government abandoned its efforts to solve the affordable housing crisis 
from the top-down with a Washington-based bureaucracy. In its place, federal policymakers embraced a decentral-
ized funding solution: the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.48
Low Income Housing Tax Credit
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, is a dollar-for-dollar 
investment tax credit (one dollar of tax credits reduces one dollar of tax liability) designed to increase the construc-
tion and rehabilitation of affordable, multifamily rental housing. The credit is allocated to state authorities on a per 
capita basis and awarded to affordable housing developers according to a scoring system that takes project viability 
and social impact into account. If awarded a tax credit allocation, developers sell the credits to investors in exchange 
for project equity. The credits are sold at market value based on a range of factors, including credit recapture risk. 
Recapture occurs when a project falls out of compliance at any point in the first 15 years of its operation. Compli-
ance is tied directly to rent affordability.49 To be in compliance a LIHTC-financed project must set aside at least 20 
percent of its units to tenants earning less than 50 percent area median income (AMI) or 40 percent to tenants earn-
ing less than 60 percent AMI.50 In practice, most projects that receive LIHTC allocations consist entirely of afford-
able units because developers receive credits in proportion to the number of affordable units set aside.51
46	 	Dynarski,	Charter Schools,	p.	6.
47	 	Education	Sector,	Growing Pains,	p.	17.
48	 	David	Erickson,	The Housing Policy Revolution: Networks and Neighborhoods,	(Washington,	DC:	Urban	Institute	Press,	2009),	pp	90-91.
49	 	Projects	can	also	fall	out	of	compliance	if	they	are	foreclosed	upon.
50	 Low Income Housing Tax Credit,	United	States	Code:	Title	26,	Section	42,	available	at	frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_
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The LIHTC program has many ancillary benefits, but its main purpose is to subsidize affordable multifamily 
housing investment.52 Equity is the riskiest part of a development’s financing and the most difficult to secure. To 
encourage the development of affordable housing, the federal government offers LIHTC investors a tax credit 
benefit—spread over 10 years—in exchange for upfront equity.53 Investors earn a return on their investment equal to 
any discount paid for the credits and can claim a tax deduction for property depreciation as well.54 Investors receive 
these benefits as long as the project remains in compliance.
Once they have raised sufficient equity, housing developers can acquire, in combination with other subsidy sources 
like HOME and CDBG55 funds, favorable bank loans to finance the remainder of the project (the credits alone 
rarely cover more than 40-50 percent of the total project cost).56 These loans would likely not be available without the 
backstop of equity acquired through the sale of the credits. This is the key benefit of the LIHTC program. With few 
exceptions, affordable housing projects would be considered too risky to finance with debt absent the equity subsidy. 
The program has been a remarkable success. More than 2.4 million affordable units have been built with LIHTC 
funds since 1987, a number nearly equal to all the federal public housing and HUD-funded units built between 
1937 and 2009.57 According to a 2009 study by Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies, this success 
stems from the program’s unique blend of social welfare policy, local empowerment, and market discipline. “The 
LIHTC program has successfully harnessed the discipline and incentives of private markets for public purposes and 
has served as an engine for decentralized and locally responsive policymaking.”58 In 2000, a bipartisan Congressio-
nal commission was created to study federal affordable housing policy. In its widely circulated report, the Millen-
nial Housing Commission concluded, “the LIHTC and HOME programs represent true and strong paradigm shift 
away from some of the less effective federal policies and programs of the past…. States and cities—not the federal 
government—now determine how to use most housing resources.”59 
Consider one affordable housing project, the Peter Claver Community. In the late 1980s the city of San Francisco 
was experiencing a sharp rise in low-income, HIV-positive residents in need of affordable housing. To meet this 
need, the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco and Mercy Housing partnered to develop 32 fully-
furnished private rooms for formerly homeless people diagnosed with HIV and AIDS. The project also included a 
number of wrap-around services including meal support, counseling, 24-hour nursing care, and financial planning 
assistance. Grant funding for the Peter Claver Community came from two foundations, the Macy’s Corporation, 
and a private anonymous donor. The remainder of the project construction financing came from the sale of LI-
HTCs and two conventional bank loans. Once built, the Peter Claver Community’s operating funds came from the 
San Francisco Department of Health and the federal government’s Ryan White CARE program for AIDS services. 
The remainder of the cost was covered by a combination of tenant rents and the U.S. Department of Housing and 
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The Peter Claver Community project illustrates the important role tax credits can play in funding public-private 
partnerships. The $830,460 in subsidized equity secured through the sale of the project’s tax credits was leveraged to 
raise an additional $355,000 in private debt financing. This is an extraordinary achievement considering the novelty 
of the project, which was conceived of in the mid-1980s. Equally impressive is the fact that federal money could be 
used so effectively to support a specific population with unique needs. At the time, HIV/AIDS was a frightening 
new disease. Even basic underwriting questions, such as whether HIV-positive tenants could dependably pay rent, 
were subject to serious debate. That a federally-subsidized multifamily rental housing project could be built in such 
an uncertain environment is a testament to the subsidy’s flexibility as a funding source. A more rigidly proscribed 
federal program would not allow for such a specialized housing project, complete with wrap-around services, com-
munal facilities, and widespread community buy-in. Further, it offers proof that federal funds can safely finance 
local strategy—a concept that could be applied to individual charter schools as well. 
The LIHTC program is instructive because it demonstrates how the federal government can successfully bring its 
substantial financial resources to bear on a decentralized, locally-based system of service providers. Three program 
elements are essential to its success: 1) protecting government from project failure risk; 2) harnessing local knowledge; 
and 3) creating a market for service providers.61 A discussion of how these three elements can be adapted to grow a 
network of high-achieving, high-poverty charter schools is below.
Protects government
Much of the federal funding that goes to support promising educational programs is allocated on an “identify, 
fund, wait, and see” basis. Take, for example, the School Improvement Grant (SIG) program. The Department of 
Education awards SIGs to local education agencies (LEAs), which allocate funds to the “persistently-lowest achiev-
ing schools.”62 The 2010 Department of Education Appropriations Act provided $546 million for SIGs in fiscal year 
2010.63 To be eligible to participate in the program, recipients of SIGs must subscribe to one of four reform models: 
turnaround, restart, closure, or transformation. Each model requires very specific changes ranging from administra-
tive restructuring to teacher accountability measures.64 These compliance parameters reflect an attempt to protect 
the government from the risk that the reforms may fail. Yet, according to the Center for Education Policy (CEP), 
“there is no single or simple strategy that is certain to improve low-performing schools.” It seems reasonable to 
assume, therefore, that no matter how closely schools adhere to their SIG reform model, some will fail. This could 
prove costly to the government because the funds it spends on reform failures are not recoverable. 
At the other end of the federal funding spectrum from SIGs are tax credits. Unlike the “identify, fund, wait, and see” 
approach of SIGs, tax credits protect the government from program failure risk. Tax credits have recapture provi-
sions that allow the government to recover public funds spent on project failures, such as when LIHTC-financed 
projects fail to maintain rent affordability minimums.
For the most part, charter schools are granted a charter by the state in which they operate, funded for a period 
of time, and then evaluated—the “identify, fund, wait, and see” approach. This is risky because charters operating 
in low-income neighborhoods face enormous day-to-day uncertainty. Those that prevail do so because they are 
flexible and responsive to the unique needs of their students, faculty, and surrounding communities. Crafting a 
charter funding scheme that attempts to predict which schools will deliver the right mix of curriculum, mission, and 
pedagogy is inherently difficult. 
A charter school tax credit would transfer this failure risk to private investors and, in so doing, eliminate the need 
to impose universal standards—or “reform models”—on charter operations. Instead, outcome-based compliance 
targets, as with other tax credit programs, could be instituted in their place. For example, a charter school could be 
held to a value-added performance standard. U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan has recently promoted value-
added standards as a way to evaluate teachers, but they could be applied to schools as well. Value-added perfor-
mance standards are based on “before and after” benchmarks measuring relative progress against an expected 





progress baseline. In the case of a charter school tax credit, a value-added achievement minimum could serve as 
a trigger for recapture. If a twenty percent improvement in math and reading scores is not achieved by year five, 
for example, the government could have recourse through the recapture process to reclaim the credits from the 
private investors that purchased them. This outcome-based approach to compliance distills education reform to its 
core element—academic improvement—and gives charters the operational flexibility to serve their unique markets 
without exposing the government to the risk that they may fail.
Of course, the more compliance risk private investors take on, the more their expectations for financial return will 
increase. Mechanically, these expectations are directly reflected in the price of the credit. As risk of failure goes up, 
investors perceive credits to be worth less and the price the investor is willing to pay for the tax credits goes down. 
Likewise, as risk of failure goes down, credits become more valuable and pricing goes up. Although these returns 
come at government expense, this approach is an efficient way to deal with program failure risk. 
Consider the following, highly stylized, example.  The government has $1 million to spend on a “charter excellence 
award program.”  In the past, 75 percent of the program award winners successfully used the funds to improve their 
students’ math and reading scores over five years (the goal of the program), while 25 percent performed no better 
than their non-award-winning counterparts. In this hypothetical, the government has two options: it can attempt to 
determine, in advance, which school will be successful and fund it with a grant (the “identify, fund, wait, and see” 
approach), or it can disburse the funds through a tax credit program.  
All else being equal, the first approach—picking correctly—clearly has the most appeal.  It is extremely risky, how-
ever.  If the government miscalculates, it could inadvertently fund an underperformer at the expense of a school 
that could have used the funds more effectively.  In other words, choosing the wrong school would cost the govern-
ment both directly, in terms of wasted funds, and indirectly, in terms of wasted opportunity.  
When the risk of making the wrong choice is factored into the equation, the government’s net expected value is 
only $750,000.  In contrast, the tax credit option manages this risk by disbursing funds on a recoverable basis.  
Under a tax credit program, the charter would sell its credits to private investors for 75 cents on the dollar, reflecting 
the perceived risk that there is a 25 percent chance that the school will underperform.  This process raises $750,000 in 
operating funds for the charter.  
After a predetermined compliance period (five years, for example), the school’s performance would be evaluated.  If 
the charter is found to be out of compliance, its credits—now held by investors—would be subject to recapture as a 
penalty.65  Conversely, if the school achieves the stated goals of the program, its credits would be worth their face 
value   $1 million   and represent a 6.7 percent simple annualized return on investment (in reduced tax liability) for 
the investors that purchased them for $750,000 five years prior.  Importantly, this does not mean that the school 
would, in either case, receive $1 million in actual funding.  To the contrary, regardless of its compliance status, the 
school would keep what it raised through the sale of its credits: $750,000, in this case.  
At first glance, this may appear to be a worse outcome than funding option one above.  In fact, the government is 
better off because the tax credit smoothes its exposure to “underperformance” risk.  Consider the government’s risk-
adjusted expected value function below:
Expected value of “Charter Excellence Award Program” = 0.25($0M) + 0.75($1M) = ($750K)
When the risk of making the wrong choice is factored into the equation, the government’s net expected value from 
option one is actually equivalent to the tax credit option ($750,000).  All else being equal, the tax credit option is 
superior because it guarantees that funds will only flow, by virtue of the recapture process, to “excellent” schools 
and their investors (and never to underperformers).
Admittedly, this hypothetical is overly-simplistic.  It does not, for example, take into account transaction costs, 




investment that defaults 25 percent of the time is, at best, a break-even proposition).  That said, the government 
does pay a hidden cost when it takes on program failure risk.  In contrast to a nonrecoverable grant, a charter school 
tax credit program would price that cost and redistribute it in the form of a return on investment.  This quasi-market 
for charter failure risk would, over time, reveal additional information and reduce charter performance uncertainty.  
As investors consider the menu of charter school investment opportunities available to them, capital would flow 
from less promising schools to more promising ones.  Eventually, investment capital would (in the ideal case) be 
limited to the schools that, according to the market, have the best chance of succeeding.  The key innovation being 
that public funds are not at risk should the market prove to be wrong.66 
Harnesses local knowledge and investment
A tax-credit-driven market for charter school program risk would create a financial incentive to accurately predict 
program success. Such predictions could be based on factors both inside and outside investors’ control. For ex-
ample, a company like Google, based in Silicon Valley, may have access to local neighborhood-level information in 
nearby East Palo Alto, which is chronically impoverished.67 This information could allow Google to more accurately 
predict what type of charter would succeed in East Palo Alto.
In addition to leveraging local information, Google could also materially “change the odds” of a charter’s success by 
making complementary investments in the neighborhood surrounding the school. If, for example, Google decided 
to locate a server farm in an underinvested part of East Palo Alto, the positive effects on crime, property values, and 
local economic activity could dramatically improve the chances of a nearby charter school’s success. In addition, 
Google.org, the company’s philanthropic arm, could concentrate grants and program-related investments (PRIs) 
in neighborhood institutions that support young people, such as the Boys and Girls Club or Little League Baseball. 
Thus, the risk market created by the tax credit would create an incentive not only to accumulate accurate informa-
tion on charter performance but to make additional investments that generate positive spillover effects in the sur-
rounding community as well.
Of course, a single investor like Google is insufficient to support a charter school tax credit market. Many market 
participants, each with unique preferences and information, are necessary to ensure market efficiency and credit 
pricing that accurately reflects investment risk. This includes non-investors, which nonetheless have a direct stake in 
the success of the community and its schools. Local government service providers, community lenders, non-profit 
advocacy groups, and business owners should all act in concert to improve student achievement. Absent a direct 
financial incentive for doing so, however, coordination among these non-investors is difficult. A tax credit would 
reward investors that successfully coordinate (or indirectly coordinate through a syndicator) these community 
stakeholders.
Creates a market for service providers
Unlike SIGs, which fund a particular program, tax credits fund process.  Affordable housing projects, for example, 
must differ dramatically in form and function to appeal to local communities. This requires the efficient coupling, 
decoupling, and recoupling of service providers to meet local housing needs. According to Benson Roberts, Senior 
Vice President for Policy and Program Development at the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), a dynamic 
market, supported by private capital and involving multiple stakeholders, is necessary to deliver this diversity at 
scale for affordable housing development:
The [affordable housing production] system is distinctively market driven, locally controlled, and per-
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lenders and investors, as well as among all levels of government. Attracting private capital is critical to 
the system, especially when governmental resources are scarce and must be stretched as far as possi-
ble. Equally important, private financing provides market discipline, ensuring that projects are properly 
planned, underwritten, and operated. Successful projects breed further private investment for subse-
quent activities, replacing the vicious cycle of disinvestment with a virtuous cycle of reinvestment.68
The flexible structure of LIHTC supports the development of this adaptive market of providers.  Likewise, a charter 
school tax credit would empower charters to experiment with a number of different educational approaches, thereby 
creating demand for supportive services and products. This would lay a foundation for a number of novel, dynamic 
public-private partnerships that, taken together, would constitute a new educational ecosystem similar to the one 
formed around affordable housing development. 
Charters, like any economic producer, face a classic “make or buy” decision when it comes to supportive services 
and programs. Many charters choose to build internal capacity to deliver services in-house. The HCZ, for example, 
provides parental workshops, health clinics, pre-kindergarten, and prevention-driven services targeting youth vio-
lence, obesity, and asthma. These programs are all funded and staffed internally.
Alternatively, a market for these services could deliver them more efficiently and cost-effectively, freeing charters 
from the difficult task of retraining education staff to deliver non-education services. A charter school tax credit 
would provide charters with the financial flexibility to “buy” instead of “make.”
A charter operating in a violent neighborhood, for example, could recruit violence prevention experts to educate 
administrators, teachers, and students alike about problem resolution and discipline strategies. Alternatively, a 
charter operating in a predominantly Hispanic neighborhood could contract with a language tutoring company to 
overcome persistent student English proficiency challenges. Or, finally, charters could recruit teacher development 
providers to train new teachers who are unfamiliar with the unusual challenges that low-income students face. A 
charter school tax credit would offer a consistent and flexible source of funding with which to pay these and other 
providers. As an added benefit, the market discipline enforced by the threat of tax credit recapture would create an 
incentive for providers to compete on price and performance, thus increasing charter purchasing power.
Alternatively, charters could use tax credit funds to extend the school year or reward teachers for being available 
after normal school hours.  They could be used to improve facilities or upgrade technology.  Some charters may in-
vest in highly advanced computer labs, for example, complete with personal computing tablets, videoconferencing 
equipment, and touch-screen blackboards. Others may build performance theaters, music halls, or health clinics (as 
the HCZ did in partnership with Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health).69 Still others may use tax 
credit funds to pay for necessary but nonstandard classroom supplies, like facial tissues and bandages—supplies 
that teachers often provide themselves.  The flexibility of the tax credit program would provide charters with the 
operational flexibility to do whatever is necessary to stay in compliance.70
That said, many of these service providers, structural investments, and partnerships may be new and untested. This 
increases the risk that they may be ineffective. Tax credits are an ideal funding solution because they can support 
wide-ranging innovation without exposing the government to innovation failure risk. In fact, a charter school tax credit 
could support nearly any kind of reform, no matter how unusual, on one condition: that it has a positive measurable 
effect on student performance. If it does not, the subsidy is returned, the school loses credibility among its investors, 
and its chances of raising tax credit funding in the future diminish. This market discipline would underpin the tax-
credit-supported charter ecosystem by weeding out ineffective service providers at little risk to the government.
68	 Benson	Roberts,	“Using	Federal	Funding	to	Mobilize	private	Capital,”	The Next American Opportunity: Good Policies for a Great America,	(Philadel-
phia:	PA,	Opportunity	Finance	Network,	2008),	p.	36,	available	at	http://www.nextamericanopportunity.org/ffi/private-capital/.
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The charter schools and investors in this diagram are included for illustrative purposes only. The $750,000 cash investment “KIPP” receives from “Google” 
reflects a credit price of 75 cents on the dollar. The $50,000 syndicator fee is an arbitrary figure.19
Part III: Charter School Tax Credit – Program Mechanics
A 
charter school tax credit program could take many forms. It could be federally allocated or allocated by 
the states. It could raise money for operating funds or wrap-around social services (or both). It could be 
allocated annually or at multi-year intervals. It could mirror or radically depart from the LIHTC. As long 
as its core element—risk mitigation through public-private partnerships—remains in place, the exact nature 
of the program can be tailored to meet the specific needs of policymakers, charter school administrators, and low-
income families. Nevertheless, there are several mechanical elements that should be considered when crafting an 
investment tax credit program. These elements include: 1) program cost; 2) credit allocation process; 3) credit award 
process; 4) program compliance requirements; 5) credit recapture process; 6) program compliance period; 7) pricing; 
and 8) expected market participants. The following section briefly discusses these mechanics.
Program cost
The program’s budget should reflect policymakers’ desired level of impact and its overall efficacy as a funding mech-
anism. More broadly, though, it should take into account the ongoing cost of the status quo. Over their working 
lifetimes, high school dropouts—who are largely low-income—cost the government, on average, $292,000 in lower 
tax revenue, incarceration costs, and social assistance benefits. Reducing the number of high school dropouts by 
even 20 percent would generate over $70 billion in additional public revenue and savings, not including the private 
benefit ($168 billion in additional income) that the high school graduates would collectively accrue.71 In effect, the 
government is faced with a choice: invest in more effective education that can reliably reduce the academic achieve-
ment gap, or invest in remedial programs that address myriad anti-social behaviors that often flow from academic 
underachievement. 
The question for policymakers, then, is how much does it cost to close the achievement gap for an individual student? 
Take two New York City charters as examples: KIPP NYC and the HCZ. KIPP NYC spends, on average, $6,243 per student 
beyond its state allocation on classroom instruction and support programs.72 Likewise, the HCZ spends approximately 
$5,000 per student beyond its state allocation to finance its “HPZ Project,” which includes its charter schools and wrap-
around services.73 Extrapolating from these two estimates, a charter school tax credit allocation would have to yield, 
on average, roughly $5,500 per student in supplementary funds to offset the cost of operating a charter school serv-
ing difficult-to-reach students in a high poverty community.74 The total size of the charter school tax credit program 
budget would then be a function of how many students are being served and average credit prices. 
Credit allocation
Tax credits can be allocated directly by the federal government, or indirectly through designated state authori-
ties. The NMTC program, for example, is administered by the Community Development Financial Institutions 
Fund (CDFI Fund), a federal entity housed in the U.S. Treasury Department that, in addition to administering the 
NMTC program on a competitive basis, also awards certified CDFIs financial assistance grants. The LIHTC, in 
contrast, is administered by State Allocation Agencies (SAAs) according to a formula allocating credits to each state 
on a per capita basis. SSAs are responsible for allocating the credits to developers, monitoring compliance, and 
reporting. Penalties for noncompliance are enforced by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) through the tax code, but 












A charter school tax credit could be administered at either the federal or state level. At the state level, allocation 
decisions could be the responsibility of program-specific state agencies or existing ones, like the Local Educational 
Agencies (LEA) that currently allocate Title I education grant funds.75 State agencies could receive allocations on a 
per capita basis, like the LIHTC, or, if the academic achievement gap is not equally distributed across the general 
population, competitively on the basis of need as the NMTC is. 
Award process
Both the LIHTC and NMTC programs award tax credits on a competitive basis (one at the state level and the other 
at the federal level, respectively). In the case of LIHTC, state tax credit authorities create Qualified Allocation Plans 
(QAPs) that outline specific affordable housing goals and additional requirements (including environmental sustain-
ability, for example).  Project developers submit applications which are scored according to how well they meet the 
goals and requirements outlined in the QAP.  The developers whose applications score highest receive allocations.
In the case of a charter school tax credit, the state authority could have the freedom to weigh certain issues such as 
the magnitude of the achievement gap or any number of school-related attributes when considering a tax credit 
application. These additional minimum requirements may allay lingering investor concerns stemming from the 
unrestricted nature of the funds.76 In addition, a charter school tax credit program could allow state allocating agen-
cies to vary the size of the award based on specific challenges faced by particular charter schools. This approach 
would differ from the way that LIHTCs and NMTCs are allocated in that, in both cases, only program participation is 
subject to competitive review, while credit award sizes are formula-driven. 
Compliance
Compliance is the determining factor in the credit recapture decision. Schools that fall out of compliance trigger recap-
ture. Defining and enforcing compliance would, therefore, be a crucial element of a charter school tax credit program. 
At its core, compliance should reflect progress that is significant and verifiable. Meaningful achievement standards and 
measurement should, accordingly, underpin compliance. Although these foundational components appear to be fairly 
straightforward, there is very little agreement on what constitutes “achievement” and how best to measure it.
Academic achievement is generally defined by subject proficiency or graduation. Subject proficiency is typically 
measured with standardized tests, whereas graduation is determined by classroom performance over a long period 
of time. By design, standardized subject proficiency testing is considered to be the more objective of the two mea-
sures, but there are widespread concerns about its fairness and relevance as a predictor of future success.77 Gradu-
ation is highly predictive of future success but, as a binary measure, it cannot capture improvement or degrees of 
progress. Graduation is also an end-process event. It is only possible to measure “achievement” in the case of gradu-
ation after the education process is complete, leaving no time to alter course should graduation be in jeopardy. 
Graduation rates can be subject to manipulation, as well. Critics have accused many schools of reclassifying drop-
outs in order to increase their graduation rates.78
Given the financial stakes, compliance would have to be clearly defined and transparent. Objective measures, such 
as standardized testing, achieve both of these requirements. Although standardized testing remains a controversial 
method of tracking student achievement, it creates clear benchmarks that can be tracked over time. From a compli-
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discounting holistic learning—although any test, standardized or not, is vulnerable to this criticism.79
From a practical standpoint, the simplest approach to test calibration would be to adopt a consensus-based federal 
compliance standard. In order to maximize its investment, the federal government would have an incentive to 
design a fair test that predicts future academic success and employability. Adopting a universal standard would be 
controversial, however, and may discourage states from participating in the program. Local control over curriculum 
standards—and, by extension, testing standards—has been an important component of the public school system 
for generations and is unlikely to change.
Alternatively, states could design their own compliance tests that reflect a unique set of academic performance 
preferences (including arts and music testing, for example). If states were empowered to create their own com-
pliance standards, however, they would have a perverse incentive to artificially increase compliance rates. Left 
unchecked, states could easily engineer their tests to favor success—redefining eighth-grade math proficiency 
as simple arithmetic, for example. In a 2007 study comparing individual state test results to the Assessment of 
Educational Progress common standard, the NCES found that differences in state-by-state performance “can be 
largely attributed to differences in the stringency of their standards.”80 In total, 15 states were identified as having 
lowered their testing standards to better comply with the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), prompting Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan to comment that, “at a time when we should be raising standards to compete in the global 
economy, more states are lowering the bar….We’re lying to our children.”81 In an attempt to preserve local control 
over curriculum standards, NCLB may have inadvertently created an incentive for states to make their proficiency 
tests easier.
To protect against wholesale standards lowering, a charter school tax credit program could—like the LIHTC—set 
minimum federal compliance standards, perhaps in math and reading, and leave the rest of the test to the state 
enforcement agencies. This would be a reasonable compromise, ensuring that the federal government achieves its 
core goals for the program while providing for the needs of local states and schools.
Compliance period
Ideally, a tax credit program designed to finance education outcomes would begin in early childhood and continue 
through high school graduation. In this ideal case, the tax credit compliance period would match the funding 
stream, beginning in pre-kindergarten and continuing uninterrupted until the child’s education outcome is defini-
tively known. This would fully align investor goals (return on investment) with those of the government (increasing 
the high school graduation rate of low-income students). From a practical standpoint, however, this would be dif-
ficult to accomplish within the existing charter school structure. With some exceptions, charter schools mimic tradi-
tional public schools in how they group students: five grade levels in elementary school, three in middle school, and 
four in high school. A credit designed to finance a full 12 years of education (or more, if kindergarten or pre-kinder-
garten were included) would have to be portable as students are promoted from one school to the next. This could 
destabilize the credit market, however, as investors may balk at the challenge of underwriting multiple schools. 
A long compliance period may have a detrimental effect on pricing, as well. A longer term would increase uncer-
tainty and reduce what investors are willing to pay for the credits. Additionally, the longer the investment period, 
the greater the liquidity and interest rate (cost of capital) risk. Long-term investments are often discounted for these 
reasons which, in this case, would yield less private capital to finance charter school operations.82  Therefore, a shorter 
compliance period may be preferable to a longer one. Mechanically, it would be easiest to issue credits with compli-
ance periods that match the time students spend in a particular school. The size of the school’s tax credit issue would, 
accordingly, be a function of the percentage of low-income students who attend it and how long they are there. 
79	 	According	to	K12	Academics,	a	national	education	resource	website,	“Critics	also	charge	that	standardized	tests	encourage	‘teaching	to	the	test’	at	
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Although shortening the compliance period would certainly simplify the program, it may also lead investors to 
favor some types of schools over others. Middle schools, for example, are often challenging learning environments. 
Investors may, as a result, shun credits awarded to middle schools and, instead, choose to invest only in elementary 
schools and high schools. This would create a funding “dead zone” of sorts, which may erase some of the positive 
gains achieved at the elementary school level and render some students unprepared for the rigors of high school. 
In theory, the perceived risk of middle school would be reflected in the pricing that middle schools receive for their 
credits. If the risk is too high, however, pricing will drop to a point where there is no market for the credits. The pro-
gram would then be ineffective, leaving middle schools underserved. 
To increase investor demand, the duration of the compliance period could be moderated by a burn-off provision. 
Credit burn-offs effectively “lock in” credits based on the achievement of intermediate compliance benchmarks. 
For example, credits issued to an elementary school may have a five-year program compliance period but, under a 
burn-off regime, the school could use annual testing to demonstrate progress. As students achieve annual testing 
benchmarks, investors would lock in an additional year of credits. Recapture, should it occur, would apply only to 
credits not locked in. This would reduce recapture risk and potentially make the credit more appealing to investors.
The risk with a burn-off provision is that the benchmark tests may not reflect real progress toward ultimate com-
pliance. Annual tests may be easier than the test administered at the end of the compliance period, for example. 
Furthermore, atomizing achievement measures creates an incentive to implement short-term programs that in-
crease benchmark scoring at the expense of long-term programs that better prepare students for lasting academic 
success. A charter school tax credit burn-off provision would have to properly align burn-off benchmarks with long-
term compliance goals in order to protect against this outcome.
Recapture
Credit recapture occurs when a project falls out of program compliance. In the case of a charter school tax credit, 
recapture would occur if a school fails to achieve certain predetermined academic benchmarks. Those benchmarks 
may differ by state (with certain federally-set minimums), but in all cases, failure to achieve them would trigger 
recapture and lead to financial losses for investors. Accordingly, investors’ perception of investment risk would 
depend upon the likelihood that a given charter will stay in compliance. If that perception of risk is high, pricing 
for credits will fall. Although this inverse relationship between risk and pricing is appropriate, too much investor 
uncertainty could cripple the program. 
The risk that a charter school tax credit may generate more initial investor uncertainty than existing tax credit pro-
grams is high. Unlike LIHTC and NMTC, a charter school tax credit would not finance a physical structure that could 
act as collateral in the transaction. This is the point of departure between tax credits that finance physical capital 
and tax credits that finance human capital (of which there are currently none). How this distinction will affect inves-
tor demand is unknown but it will likely increase their perception of risk.83 
Fortunately, there are other ways to reduce recapture risk in the absence of collateral. One, as mentioned earlier, is 
with a “burn-off” policy—locking in credits as progress benchmarks are achieved in advance of the final compliance 
review at the end of the compliance period. Another is to allow for a “cure period.” A cure period gives investors 
additional time to “cure” their investments should they fall out of compliance. In practice, this would allow for last-
ditch efforts to turn a failing charter around before its credits are recaptured. 
Consider an elementary school example. A charter elementary school receives an allocation of credits and, as 
specified by the program’s compliance requirements, has four years to prepare 80 percent of its fourth-grade 
students for math and reading proficiency at grade level. If the school achieves the benchmark, investors are fully 
protected from recapture. If, however, the school does not achieve the benchmark, a cure period would allow for a 
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proficiency, investors retain their credits. If not, the credits are recaptured. A reasonable cure period would alleviate 
some investor recapture anxiety and help stabilize credit pricing at a sustainable level.84
Pricing
Credit pricing will vary depending on the risk of noncompliance (based primarily on the quality of the school sell-
ing the credits) and investor demand. As discussed previously, the economic return for investing in charter school 
tax credits is equivalent to the discount paid for them relative to their face value. This creates an incentive for 
investors to pay less for credits. Conversely, charter schools have an incentive to demonstrate success to signal lower 
recapture risk, increasing the price paid for their credits. 
Ideally, this will result in a credit price that accurately reflects the school’s failure risk. Of course, this assumes a well-
functioning market. If, for example, there are too few investors or systemically unreliable charter performance data, 
the market price for credits could fall dramatically. If the price drops too low, it will yield too little private investment 
capital, rendering the program ineffective. Accordingly, it would be sensible to set a pricing floor so that, should 
pricing fall below a certain threshold, the transaction could be voided and the school’s credits reallocated. Or, alter-
natively, schools could reach out to supporting organizations, such as foundations, to fill the funding gap between 
the credit price and the mandated floor. The government could play a credit enhancement or guarantor role as 
well, as the Department of Energy does with solar installations and the Department of Education does with charter 
school facilities loans. Regardless, a mandated pricing floor, gap financing strategy, or credit enhancement program 
(or some combination of the three) should be in place to ensure that sufficient capital flows to the charters receiv-
ing credit allocations and protect against investment speculators in search of windfall profits.
Market participants
The market for tax credit investors could include more traditional investors, such as CRA-motivated banks and in-
surance companies, but also individuals and corporations.85 As long as the investor has tax liability, there would be 
an incentive to participate in the market. Investors could engage schools directly or indirectly through syndicators 
that have developed expertise in underwriting successful charter schools and marketing credits to investors. Invest-
ment syndicators currently play a key role in both NMTC and LIHTC transactions. As intermediaries, syndicators 
aggregate investor dollars, identify investments, and monitor their portfolios for compliance purposes. Conceiv-
ably, charter management organizations (also known as CMOs) could evolve into tax credit syndicators themselves. 
Instead of just managing schools, as they do today, they could finance and monitor them on behalf of investors.
There may also be an opportunity for other financial partners to participate indirectly in the tax credit transaction. 
Instead of purchasing a school’s credits, for example, a corporate or private donor could sponsor a performing arts 
center or a teacher excellence award.86 The donation could be significant enough to affect student performance, 
thereby increasing the value of the school’s tax credits and allowing it to raise additional capital to support its 
programs. In other words, there could be a layering of investments alongside grants and PRIs that increase the likeli-
hood of good student performance and the full vesting of tax credit benefits.
Government could play a role as well. Public health agencies, for example, could partner with charters to locate 
health clinics on school property. The clinics could increase student school attendance by improving student health 
and double as job training centers that inspire students to pursue the hard sciences.87 Again, this may have a positive 
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Part IV: Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths
Increases funding for high-performing public schools
High-poverty public school districts receive, on average, $773 less per student, per year, than low-poverty districts.88 
Meanwhile, the schools operating in these districts face significant poverty-related challenges that their low-poverty 
counterparts do not face. At a minimum, these schools should receive funding parity and, arguably, supplementary 
funds as well. 
The charter school tax credit would deliver additional federal funds to high-achieving public schools that can 
demonstrate success in closing the academic achievement gap among low-income students. These funds would be 
(essentially) unrestricted, allowing schools to meet local needs and deliver customized educational services.
Protects government from program failure
By transferring program failure risk to private investors, the charter school tax credit would ensure that every dollar 
spent is tied directly to a positive, measurable education outcome. This is a significant improvement over the status 
quo—investing in schools on the basis of past performance or future promise, with no recourse should those assess-
ments prove to be wrong.
This is particularly important during periods of fiscal austerity. In commenting about the LIHTC in 1992, the Los 
Angeles Times argued that the tax credit “forms the cornerstone of the numerous public/private partnerships that are 
increasingly the salvation of cash-short cities and states.”89 Today, as in 1992, budget deficits are leading to social 
program cuts. As policymakers seek to balance their budgets going forward, tax credit programs can offer a fiscally-
responsible means of funding human capital improvements because funding only flows to programs that work.  
Further, the benefits this particular tax credit program would generate   better education outcomes for low-income 
students   is known to save significant public funds in the long run.
Instills performance-based accountability
A charter school tax credit program’s compliance requirements would establish benchmarks for success. These 
benchmarks would reflect specific, measurable goals demonstrating low-income student achievement. These stan-
dards would have the dual benefit of allowing the government to monitor improvement but also allowing the 
school to evaluate its own programs and adjust them as needed. Building this information feedback aspect of the 
program could be its greatest ancillary benefit, as it would provide consistent, reliable information on what is and 
what is not working.
Leverages private sources of capital and information for public education
A charter school tax credit program would directly raise private capital to support charter operations. In the end, 
however, this may prove to be only a fraction of the total funds raised under the umbrella of the program. Low-
income student performance is influenced by a host of factors, many outside the direct purview of school. As a 
result, investors may find complementary community investments to be an effective way to protect their tax credit 
investment. These investments, combined with the funds raised by the tax credit program, could be sufficient to 
transform entire neighborhoods, as the Harlem Children’s Zone has done in New York City.
A charter school tax credit would also increase the engagement of other stakeholders in the education process, 
including, among others, local businesses, universities, nonprofits, and neighborhood residents. As is the case with 
the LIHTC, a charter school tax credit program would create a financial incentive to organize these community 
stakeholders and leverage their private information. It is also a way to engage them directly in a shared societal 
goal: better equipped and more productive workers and citizens.
88	 	The	Education	Trust,	Education Watch National Report	(Washington,	DC:	April	2009),	p.	13,	available	at	www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/
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Adaptable to local needs and conditions
Low-income students have unique needs, both academically and socially, and schools that serve low-income stu-
dents need the operational flexibility to meet them. Likewise, the funding streams that support these schools should 
be sensitive to this operational diversity and allow for adaptive use. A charter school tax credit program, by virtue 
of its built-in accountability checks, is the perfect vehicle to deliver such “adaptive” funding. Unlike direct expendi-
tures, which are not recoverable, tax credits allow for experimentation without exposing the government to failure 
risk. This affords schools the freedom to address local needs without onerous, and potentially restrictive, oversight. 
Weaknesses
Pro-cyclical
The primary value of tax credits to investors is that they reduce tax liability. As a result, when tax liability decreases, 
like during a recession, demand for tax credits decreases. This causes the price for tax credits to drop, sometimes pre-
cipitously. As prices drop, sellers receive less for their credits, which can hamper their ability to successfully imple-
ment their obligations under the program.
This problem is particularly acute when the tax credit investor base is comprised of a limited number of inves-
tors. Over-reliance on a small, homogeneous investor base introduces significant pricing variability, endangering 
the program during down-market periods.90 This pro-cyclical pricing challenge can be improved through investor 
diversification. Different types of investors, both corporate and individual, should be encouraged to participate in 
the program. This may necessitate a change in tax law, particularly with respect to individuals currently restricted by 
passive loss rules.91 
Low initial credit prices
As with many new investment products, charter school tax credits would likely carry a high risk premium that keeps 
prices low initially. When the LIHTC program was passed in 1987, a dollar’s worth of credits only raised $0.45 in 
project equity.92 Once the program’s risks were better understood, however, pricing steadily increased to over $0.60 
by 1996 and continued to rise until it briefly exceeded one dollar before the financial sector crash in 2008. As of 
October 2010, the average price of a dollar’s worth of LIHTCs was just above $0.75.93 
While it is impossible to predict investor demand, it stands to reason that a charter school tax credit program could 
see a similar price trajectory over time. As the public-private high-poverty charter school network develops, in-
vestors will likely search out charters with track records of high achievement. In the short term, this will increase 
demand for credits held by a select number of schools, to the detriment of unseasoned or unusual schools with 
untested programs. However, over time, as more charters demonstrate success, new capital will enter the market, 
demand for credits will go up, more schools will receive investments, and credit prices will eventually accurately re-
flect investor risk. Until that pricing equilibrium is achieved, credits will likely remain undervalued and charters may 
have to reach out to grantmakers to fill program funding gaps.
Achievement difficult to define/quantify/track
The key to a successful charter school tax credit program is to match the program goals—academic improvement—with 
the program compliance requirements. Although this is seemingly straightforward, there is widespread disagreement 
about what constitutes academic improvement and how to track it. Most everyone agrees that the ultimate goal of 
any education program should be young adults who are better prepared for success in life and the workplace. But 
what are the critical variables that translate into success? High school graduation? Improved literacy? Math proficien-
cy? It is difficult to know which variable, or combination of variables, will lead to success in the long run. 







The answer, then, may be to create a composite compliance dashboard that could include standardized test scores, 
subjective evaluations, health and wellness measures, attendance rates, and even parental involvement. The advan-
tage of a composite compliance system is that it would allow for a more holistic evaluation of a student’s advance-
ment. In order to protect the integrity of the program, however, such a dashboard would have to be constructed and 
administered in a transparent way that is, to the maximum extent possible, incorruptible by either school officials or 
their tax credit investors.
Charter scarcity
A charter school tax credit would support charters operating in low-income communities with much-needed supple-
mentary funding. But what about communities without charters? Almost 90 percent of U.S. school districts “have 
no charter schools within their boundaries, perhaps in large measure because so many school districts are so very 
small.” This tends to disadvantage rural school districts, making charters “largely an urban phenomenon,” according 
to the National Charter School Research Project.94
In order to ensure that a charter school tax credit program is equitably administered, some credits should be re-
served for new schools. In the short-term this could result in persistently low credit prices. However, over time, the 
existence of a new, predictable, funding stream should encourage the development of a robust, widely-distributed 
network of charter schools supported by appropriately high credit prices. 
If the LIHTC is any guide, this growth could come quickly. The number of Community Development Corpora-
tions, the initial recipients of LIHTCs, roughly doubled—from 1,750 to 3,600— in the 10 years following the creation 
of the LIHTC program.95 This rapid growth was only possible—and fiscally responsible—because the government was 
protected from project failure risk. Although it is not perfectly analogous, a new network of charter schools may see 
similar growth under a tax credit program. 
Likewise, in areas with investor scarcity, increasing demand for the credits should attract capital to more remote 
geographies. If not, the Community Reinvestment Act’s geography-based assessment areas may encourage some 
banks to seek out charter school tax credit investments (assuming they are CRA-eligible, which they may not be) in 
underserved communities.
Program participation may strain school administrative capacity
Existing tax credit programs, like LIHTC, are complex. As a result, most tax-credit-financed deals require the partici-
pation of accountants, consultants, and lawyers, thus increasing project costs. Schools participating in a tax credit 
program may encounter similar program complexity, potentially straining administrative capacity and possibly rais-
ing program participation costs should outside assistance be needed. Schools are in the education business, not the 
tax credit finance business. This distinction should be considered as participation and reporting requirements are 
implemented. 
Tension between school and investors—lines of authority unclear
A charter school tax credit program would introduce a new participant—the tax credit investor—to school adminis-
tration. What role, if any, should the investor have in school policy? On the one hand, educators should manage 
education-related issues, but on the other, investors will have an interest in protecting their investment. How will 
school administrators and school investors resolve differences in approach when they arise? The HCZ, for example, 
is accountable to a Board of Trustees that provides oversight, fundraising, and support to HCZ administrators.96 
Likewise, KIPP schools are individually managed by local boards of directors and a KIPP-trained “school leader.”97 
These arrangements may work for HCZ and KIPP but may not be a good fit for all charters. Regardless of how, it is 
important to address this governance issue in advance to avoid conflict between the two parties.
94	 	Jon	Christensen,	Jacqueline	Meijer-Irons,	and	Robin	J.	Lake,	“The	Charter	Landscape,	2004-2009,”	Hopes, Fears, and Reality: A Balanced Look at 
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This paper is intended to provoke a new way of thinking about human capital investment.  It proposes using a 
financing tool used in one context (affordable housing), and applying it to another (education).  If the proposal 
has any merit, a pilot program may be an appropriate next step. The pilot could be administered at the govern-
ment level or possibly by a foundation that is willing to commit funds that mimic tax credits.  In either case, a pilot 
would expand our understanding of the program’s practical applicability should it be scaled on a larger basis.
In the meantime, more attention should be paid to high-poverty schools.  Public schools play a unique role in our 
communities. The quality of a neighborhood’s public schools is highly predictive of community stability. From a 
community development standpoint, improving schools may have far more impact than affordable housing, job 
training, or small business development (three typical community development interventions). Of course, it is dif-
ficult to improve school quality without simultaneously improving the community in which they operate, which 
argues for investment in affordable housing, job training programs, and small business development. A charter 
school tax credit would align incentives to achieve both. Schools could, effectively, play the role of community 
“quarterback,” helping to organize and facilitate community development projects that support its students and the 
neighborhood at large.98
Investment tax credits have been traditionally used to raise funds for physical capital development. And yet, physi-
cal assets such as housing and facilities can only go so far as community development strategies. What is needed 
to complement conventional tax credits is a program that raises funds for human capital development. At a recent 
Federal Reserve conference Preston Pinkett, head of Prudential’s Social Investment Program, commented that:
I would say the way to play in this game [community development] is to not play as an arms-length lend-
er hoping that you might get repaid at some interest rate that doesn’t cover the cost of capital, in some 
period of time, but really to jump in like an equity investor would, like a private equity investor, a venture 
capitalist who says, Hey I own this community…. If we act like we are equity investors as opposed to 
lenders, and we participate like it matters, because it does, I think we have a chance to grapple with this.99
A charter school tax credit would formalize that sentiment, creating an equity-like investment structure to support 
students in high-poverty communities. Furthermore, if the financial incentives are aligned correctly, schools and 
their tax credit investors may adopt new strategies, such as supporting early childhood programs, to make sure 
children show up “school ready” to learn in order to protect their mutual investment in students’ success.
The charter school tax credit reflects this broader view of education reform. Schools of all kinds need funding sourc-
es that match their operational needs. In the case of charter schools serving low-income students, those needs tend 
to be diverse and require funding flexibility. An investment tax credit structure could deliver this flexible funding to 
a diverse network of locally administered charters operating in challenging, high-poverty environments.
98	 	The	concept	of	a	“community	quarterback”	is	discussed	at	length	in	Erickson,	The Housing Policy Revolution.
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